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Introduction
Territorial disputes in East Asia continue to be a source of tension be-tween countries in the region. In the South China Sea, China, Taiwan,the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia argue over the owner-
ship and control of islands that would give them exclusive access to sub-
stantial oil and natural gas resources. (1) The Liancourt Rocks, also known as
Dokdo or Tokto in Korean and as the Takeshima Islands in Japanese, repre-
sent another territorial dispute that continues to plague the region. Most
significant, though, is the ongoing territorial row over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands, which are claimed by Japan, Taiwan, and mainland China. 
In the autumn of 2010, a Chinese fishing vessel rammed a Japanese Coast
Guard vessel in the area surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. (2) The cap-
tain, a Chinese national, was arrested and incarcerated in an Okinawan jail to
await trial for his infringement of Japanese territory and for damaging the
Japanese Coast Guard vessel. (3) The arrest of the fisherman resulted in a public
outcry against the Japanese government in China and demands to have the
fisherman released and repatriated. (4) More significantly, the Chinese response
to this incident involved tacit trading sanctions, namely a limit on the export
of rare earth materials to Japan and Japanese businesses within China and, ac-
cording to the Japanese embassy in Beijing (personal communication, 11 No-
vember 2011), an informal boycott of Japanese products in China. (5) Japanese
businesses affected by this embargo, in cooperation with the Japanese gov-
ernment, responded by reducing their dependence on China for rare earth ma-
terials through intensifying exploration and mining in other parts of the world
(Japanese embassy in Beijing, personal communication, 11 November 2011). (6)
Following the return of the detained fisherman to China on 24 September
2010, Sino-Japanese tensions over the disputed islands returned to their pre-
clash levels until the nationalist Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, made a
proposal to purchase the disputed islands from their private owner in early April
2012, leading to the re-emergence of tension in August 2012, when a group of
Taiwanese and Hong Kong activists landed on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.(7)This
landing was followed by a Tokyo lawmaker also landing on the island and Japan-
ese government negotiations to purchase the remaining islands from their private
owner in an effort to prevent Governor Ishihara from purchasing the islands. (8)
In China, the Japanese move to nationalise the islands was interpreted by
analysts and citizens as an instance of overt coordination between Governor
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Ishihara and the then PM Noda rather than an effort to prevent a provoca-
tive figure from gaining control of the disputed islands. (9) For many, it was
inconceivable that a local leader such as Governor Ishihara could “engage
in the purchase of these islands without collusion with the national gov-
ernment” (Interview with Chinese scholar in Beijing, 11 October 2012). 
On 11 September 2012, PM Noda announced the purchase of the dis-
puted islands from their private owner, resulting in a fierce backlash from
the mainland Chinese government and its citizens, (10) including “a string of
measures, termed ‘combination punches’, that bore the hallmarks of a well-
planned campaign with multi-agency coordination and high-level decision
making,” (11) as well as a less bellicose reaction by citizens in Hong Kong and
Taiwan. (12) At the government level, China cut off communications and
began a vocal campaign that blamed Tokyo for the dispute because it had
“failed to liquidate militarism.” (13) At the popular level, there were wide-
spread anti-Japanese riots, boycotting of Japanese products, and vandalism
directed against Japanese businesses and Japanese business interests
throughout mainland China. (14)
This article examines the repercussions of Sino-Japanese territorial friction
for bilateral trade. It employs state territorial dispute resolution approaches
and interviews with businesses, scholars, and government officials in China,
Japan, and Hong Kong. Primary data has been gathered from policy papers
and businesses to argue that the traditional seikei bunri (separation of politics
and economics) relationship that existed between Japan and China in the
post-normalisation period has given way to a more confrontational relation-
ship in which economic pressure can be and is applied as a means to press
Japan on bilateral issues. This article ponders whether the territorial tensions
between Japan and China constitute a watershed moment for the two Asian
giants in terms of deepening their economic integration. The author recognises
that the territorial dispute is a barometer of the state of bilateral relations
between Japan and China and that the territorial issue is connected to do-
mestic politics and socio-economic stability within each state, downstream
territorial issues, and broader security issues. This paper takes no position on
the sovereignty of these disputed territories; rather, the author is interested
in how the territorial dispute is tangentially connected to trade relations. 
The first section introduces this paper’s argument and methodological frame-
work with reference to previous research on territorial dispute settlement
within the East Asian context. The second section provides a brief account the
post-World War II economic relations between Japan and China. It is inten-
tionally brief to allow the paper to focus on the relationship between current
and pending territorial disputes and changing trade patterns. The third section
discusses an abbreviated list of the effects of the recent trade disputes on
Japan-China trade relations. The fourth section then considers some possible
mid- and long-term effects of the recent turn in bilateral relations. It is shown
that Japanese companies are attempting to hedge their economic bets by par-
tially deleveraging their investments in China while looking for friendlier pas-
tures in the ASEAN states. Lastly, this paper concludes by discussing the
implications of the end of seikei bunri relations between Japan and China for
bilateral and regional relations.
Primary data is drawn from 50 interviews in Hong Kong and Japan with
Japanese businesses conducting business in China, using snowball sam-
pling from January 2012 to September 2013. Interviews were conducted
using Japanese and English and recorded for transcription. Interviews were
also conducted in person and in personal communication with diplomats
and scholars in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Tokyo. Informants from various
business sectors shared their primary data and views on the relationship
between trade and investment strategies in light of the anti-Japanese riots
that took place in fall 2012. Meanwhile, testimony from diplomats expe-
rienced in managing bilateral relations between Japan and China offer in-
sights into the complex links between the territorial dispute, domestic
politics and wider geopolitical issues. They also offer insights into the shift-
ing approaches to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. 
Approaches to dispute settlement
International relations scholars have spent considerable effort to under-
stand the approaches that states utilise in territorial dispute resolution. Ap-
proaches vary from compromise and concession to aggression and war. Nie
Hongyi, in his 2009 article “Explaining Chinese Solutions to Territorial Dis-
putes with Neighbour States,” attempted to examine why China took hard-
line policies in certain territorial and border disputes while a more
concessionary approach in others. (15) Employing domestic politics-oriented
theories, transition theories, equilibrium theory, and institutional theories
to explain China’s approaches to dealing with territorial disputes, Nie
demonstrated that “China resolved disputes with states that did not have
expansionary territorial designs through negotiations that emphasised mu-
tual understanding and tolerance, and worked towards a mutually beneficial
and equitable solution.” (16) Nie’s comparative study of border disputes be-
tween China and the USSR, China and Vietnam, and China and India in the
post-WWII period demonstrated that China’s approach to territorial dis-
putes has grown and adapted hand-in-hand with its growing economic
clout. 
The above theoretical approach contrasts with that of the editor of Peace
in Northeast Asia: Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes with
China, Korea and the Russian Federation. Thomas J. Schoenbaum’s prescrip-
tive approach to territorial settlement is based on three separate negotiated
agreements between Korea-Japan, Japan-China, and Japan-Russia. (17) In-
stead of positing a simplistic dichotomy between strategies for the resolu-
tion of territorial disputes characterised by “concession” or “aggression,”
Schoenbaum emphasises negotiations among interested parties to balance
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their national and regional geopolitical needs in a historical and legal con-
text framed by international law. This negotiation-based approach resonates
with Kimie Hara’s dispute resolution recommendations, although the details
of the negotiated settlement differ. (18)
Other scholars have conducted their analysis of territorial disputes on
the basis of the sovereignty game framework, which takes “the ability to
exercise sovereignty over a territory and to have that sovereignty recog-
nised, as the basic desire of a state involved in a territorial dispute.” (19) For
O’Shea, Japan and China have adopted more uncompromising positions
on the territorial issue at the expense of weakening their bilateral rela-
tions. (20) China has prevented Japan from exercising complete and com-
prehensive sovereignty and pressed its own claims, while Japan has been
able to limit China’s claims on the islands by pressing the status quo. At
the same time that they have secured their own and weakened each
other’s interests, Chinese approaches to the escalated territorial tensions
in fall 2012 resulted in mutually unbeneficial economic disruptions. (21) On
the Japanese side, exports to China plummeted, while at the same time
important exports of small machinery parts for manufacturing bases in
China also dropped, having a deleterious effect on manufacturing in
China. (22)
The changing structure of the international system has also been evoked in
analyses of how China has dealt with territorial disputes. (23) Hyer argued that
the different approaches taken by China via territorial disputes that exist within
the East and South China Sea could be attributed to the necessity of counter-
balancing the USSR during the Cold War. Maintaining the status quo regarding
the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute during the Cold War period, Beijing mod-
erated its rigid position on the territorial issue. Beijing made it clear that China
“absolutely will not permit” the territorial dispute to “sow discord in the friendly
relations between the Chinese and Japanese people.” (24) According to Hyer’s
interpretation, because of a change in the perception of Japan’s role in China’s
foreign policy, “Japan’s ‘wicked tactic’ of ‘postponing resolution’ had become a
virtue; flexibility was completely acceptable in the pursuit of entente with a
former enemy, Japan, in order to confront a former ally, the USSR, which had
become the preeminent threat to China’s security.” (25)
It may be observed that approaches to the handling of Sino-Japanese ter-
ritorial disputes variously involve appeals to international law, engage in 'sov-
ereignty games', follow single- or multi-track negotiating strategies, or adopt
tactical, aggressive or concessionary approaches, depending on the interests
and relative strength of the parties to the dispute. The territorial dispute be-
tween Japan and China that erupted during the second half of 2012 wit-
nessed a congregation of domestic political agents coming together to push
for particular policy responses. On the Japanese side, the effort to block the
purchase of the islands by the nationalist Ishihara was driven by Japanese
government concerns regarding the negative repercussions for Japan-China
relations were the islands to be acquired by Tokyo municipality. On the Chi-
nese side, a forthcoming power transition and the need to demonstrate
strong military credentials and distract the populace from growing social in-
equality were powerful drivers of a strong and uncompromising stance on
the disputed territories.
Using the “sovereignty game framework” espoused by O’Shea and Nie’s
thesis that “China resolved disputes with states that did not have expan-
sionary territorial designs through negotiations that emphasised mutual un-
derstanding and tolerance, and worked towards a mutually beneficial and
equitable solution,” (26) I hypothesise that the territorial dispute between
Japan and China has shifted away from a concessionary-based, quiet diplo-
macy approach towards an approach that clearly recognises the reorgani-
sation of the international system and relative economic weakening of key
players in that system (Japan and the US). China has taken a more assertive
approach to exerting its territorial claims vis-à-vis the Japanese by eschew-
ing its historical pattern of resolving disputes through negotiation and mak-
ing concessions based on mutually equitable and acceptable terms. In terms
of O’Shea’s sovereignty game framework, it could be argued that China’s
recent assertive behaviour regarding the disputed territories demonstrates
that it has been able to unbalance Japan’s unquestioned sovereignty
through repeated incursion into Japanese territory involving both military
and non-military vessels. (27) More assertive behaviour from China is also in-
dicative of the success of political groups that advocate more aggressive
approaches to territorial issues over those that stress the economic risks
associated with a decline in bilateral relations. This more unyielding ap-
proach to territorial disputes may also be indicative of territorial dispute
strategies that may be applied in other territorial disputes within the region
and particularly in the South China Sea. 
Background on trade relations
Trade relations between Japan and China have mostly expanded in the
post-WWII period. Maruyama breaks down this economic development into
four periods: (1) The 1950-60s, in which trade was mostly private sector-
oriented but also involved small-scale, selected, pro-Chinese firms; (2) the
1970s, in which intergovernmental trade (encouraged by both governments
and facilitated by Japanese Overseas Development Aid) began to flow fol-
lowing the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations; (3) the 1980s, when
there was substantial improvement of bilateral economic cooperation that
occurred in concert with Deng Xiaoping’s stewardship over China; and (4)
the mid-1980s onward, which witnessed the rise of a more equal trade re-
lationship through direct investment and stabilisation of the Chinese econ-
omy and political governance. (28) This account of the shifting patterns of
economic relations between the two states closely follows changes in the
structure of the international system and opportunities to engage China as
it normalised relations with the US and Japan. 
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Hattori and Kojima discuss economic relations between Japan and China in
terms of economic cooperation and Chinese prosperity. (29) Identifying three
phases in post-normalisation Sino-Japanese economic relations, Hattori and
Kojima see the 1970s period as characterised by the promotion of mutual
economic dependence based on increased trade. They describe the 1980s as
a period typified by large volumes of Japanese foreign direct investments (FDI)
and monetary loans that contributed to building Chinese infrastructure and
the expansive production network that exists in China today. In the 1990s,
the overwhelming focus on FDI was succeeded by a combination of trade, in-
vestment, and official overseas development aid (ODA) in an effort to con-
solidate past gains and establish deeper economic integration. (30)
JETRO, Japan’s trade office overseas, asserts that Japan’s Outward FDI to
China (Balance of Payments basis, net and flow) increased from US$1.86
billion in 1997 to US$12.65 billion in 2011. (31) In terms of Japan’s Inward
FDI from China (Balance of Payments basis, net and flow), there was an in-
crease from US$-22 million in 1997 to US$109 million in 2011. As of De-
cember 2012, the total trade between Japan and China was US$333.7
billion. (32) The drop in trade between the two countries from 2008 to 2009
can be attributed to the global financial crisis, in which not just Sino-Japan-
ese trade was affected but also global trade in general. (33) The decrease in
trade in 2012 between Japan and China cannot be attributed to a financial
crisis. On the contrary, the drop in 2012 can be attributed to the territorial
disputes between Japan and China and the Chinese consumer boycott of
Japanese brands. (34)
Despite these two blips, post-normalisation trade between Japan and
China has grown consistently (see Graph 1). Today, China and Japan are each
other’s largest trading partners in the region, with China being home to ex-
tensive Japanese production networks. (35)
Immediate trade effects of territorial
disputes
Territorial tensions have affected trade relations between Japan and China
in at least five ways. First, there were immediate import/export effects as-
sociated with Chinese abstention (voluntary and government-encouraged)
from buying Japanese brands. JETRO’s month-by-month and year-by-year
data on import/export trade relations demonstrates significant impact on
the sales of Japanese brands in China as the dispute intensified in the fall of
2012. Second, Japanese companies located in China that were victims of
anti-Japanese vandalism of their businesses had to temporarily shut down
to avoid further damage and accrued the cost of repairing their business as
the violence dissipated. Third, some Japanese companies in China temporar-
ily closed their businesses to wait out anti-Japanese sentiments and protect
their interests. Fourth, there was a decrease in travel between Japan and
China affecting businesses associated with the tourism industry. Fifth, Japan-
ese businesses investing in China have deliberately slowed down and are
“exercising caution regarding future investments in China as the Sino-Japan-
ese relations normalise.” (36)
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In terms of import/export relations, the territorial disputes between China
and Japan have affected short-term trade relations between the two coun-
tries. For example, at the height of the anti-Japanese movements, the sales
volume of Japanese-made cars in China dropped 2% year-on-year. (37) Sales
of cars produced by Germany, US, South Korea, and France went up 25%,
19%, 12%, and 4% year-on-year, respectively. (38) In response, Japanese car
manufacturers have already implemented strategies to restore their brand
images in China by selling models tailored to the Chinese market and of-
fering discounts or programs such as free repair of cars damaged during
anti-Japanese protests in an effort to avoid another nationalistic backlash
against their products. (39)
This reduction in trade with Japan, whether officially sanctioned or spon-
taneous, seems to have a precedent in China’s dealings with other countries
that do not follow Chinese wishes. In a study employing the “gravity model”
of exports to China from 159 partner countries between 1991 and 2008 to
test the extent to which bilateral tensions affect trade with autocratic China,
it was found that countries that deviated from the political imperatives of
Beijing, in this case meeting with the Dalai Lama at high political levels,
were subject to punitive economic measures. They caused trade to decrease
between 8.1% and 16.9%, depending on which measure was being used. (40)
Other recent examples of the use of punitive economic tactics related to
political disagreements include China stopping the import of Philippines’
bananas; disruption of travel by Chinese tourists to the Philippines, (41)
France, (42) and Norway; and stopping the import of Norwegian Salmon and
removing Norway from the list of countries allowed visa-free visits to Bei-
jing after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo. (43)
Mirroring the Japanese automobile industry’s decline in car sales in China
throughout the elevated tensions associated with the territorial disputes,
JETRO’s month-by-month and year-by-year comparative data on changes
in value of exports and imports by area and country (see graphs 1 and 2)
show that trade between the two countries increased year-by-year up until
2011. Graph 2 shows a decrease in exports to China beginning in August at
the start of the recent territorial disputes, followed by a continuing month-
by-month drop as tensions between China and Japan increased. 
Anti-Japanese vandalism occurred in the fashion and technology indus-
tries: UNIQLO shut down 42 stores in China, AEON shut down 30 of 35
stores, Nissan Motor stopped manufacturing in two factories, and Canon,
Sony, Panasonic, and Hitachi all temporarily closed factories. (44) Although
they were only temporary shut downs, the business leaders in each of these
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sectors continue to express reservations about bolstering investment in
China until relations normalise or stabilise. (45)
In the wake of the recent riots, there is little chance that we will be
able to change [China’s] structure through dialogue and international
public opinion. As such there is a national risk associated with doing
business in China and we should consider the possibility of relocating.
(Japanese executive accountant, interview, February 2013)
The recent riots are one of many reasons, including rising labour
costs, corruption, and environmental issues, for retreating from the
Chinese market. The market in China does not work like Japan (or
other countries) and we are becoming more and more hesitant about
further investment. (Former Japanese Company President, Linen In-
dustry, interview, May 2013)
Businesses in sectors other than manufacturing, such as retail (46) and
tourism, (47) were also affected by territorial friction. Significant drops in
tourism from and to China/Japan are a case in point. Following the anti-
Japanese riots that took place in cities in China in the fall of 2012, Japanese
tourists cancelled their travel plans out of fear of violence, (48) and Chinese
tourists to Japan cancelled their travel plans to Japan, resulting in a signifi-
cant impact on tourist-related industries in both countries. (49)
We have seen a decrease in the number of people travelling from
China to Japan and from Japan to China since the incident started in
September 2012. In addition to socioeconomic effects of the ten-
sions, we have seen effects on cultural exchanges. (Local government
official in Ibaraki Prefecture, interview, February 2013)
The territorial tensions between Japan and China have had a major im-
mediate impact on trade relations between East Asia’s two largest trading
partners, although the examples discussed above merely serve to illustrate
a situation characterised by enormous complexity and variety. 
Discussion: Mid- and long-term forecast
The impact of the territorial dispute on trade relations needs to be put
into historical perspective. Examining the relations between China and Japan
since the end of WWII and their interest in the disputed territories, it is clear
that China showed little or no interest in the islands until their official re-
version to Japan and the discovery of energy resources. (50) Even with the
discovery of resources, conversations between Chinese and Japanese leaders
at the time came to an understanding that the territorial dispute would not
deter economic relations. 
When a reporter asked about ownership of the Senkaku islands, the
audience became tense, but Deng replied that the Chinese and the
Japanese held different views, used different names for the islands,
and should put the issue aside so that later generations, who would
be wiser than those present, could solve the problem. (51)
In this sense, Japan’s seikei bunri approach to relations with China remained
the hallmark of their bilateral relations and mutually benefitted the two coun-
tries. The Japanese could continue to expand their manufacturing base into
China, taking advantage of the unlimited supply of cheap labour and materials.
On the Chinese side, putting the dispute under the table and concentrating
on economic development, the construction of infrastructure, and the expan-
sion of trade was prioritised over territorial disputes.
As Hyer, Nie, and others demonstrated in their studies cited above, China
has sought advantages and has taken a more aggressive stance vis-à-vis
other states in territorial disputes when that state is perceived to be in a
weaker or disadvantageous situation. Based on this evidence and consider-
ing the timing, the recent more aggressive approach by the Chinese vis-à-
vis the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands can be related to the perceived weakness
of Japan and the US Security Alliance in light of the 2008 financial crisis,
the prolonged stagnation of the Japanese economy, the political instability
in Japan resulting from frequent leadership changes, the need of the Com-
munist regime to demonstrate its strength through a refusal to compromise
over the "core" issue of territorial integrity, and the rapid growth of the Chi-
nese economy. (52) Critically, domestic instability within China and growing
internal discontent associated with corruption, growing social inequality,
and environmental degradation have also emboldened China in its handling
of territorial disputes such as the one with Japan, and they provide us with
some insight into the future direction of trade and economic relations in
the region. 
In addition to the immediate effects of both spontaneous and govern-
ment-encouraged abstention from purchasing Japanese brands,(53) trade was
disrupted by physical damage to Japanese-owned companies manufacturing
or providing services in China,(54) and confidence in China as an attractive
destination for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been under-
mined at best and shattered at worst. (55)
As a result of the recent anti-Japanese riots, there has been a reduc-
tion in the willingness to develop stores in China. (Japanese National
Project Developer, interview, February 2013)
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Special feature
Last year, I visited China three times to expand our business. How-
ever, following the anti-Japanese movement, I felt that it would
be difficult to continue this expansion. There are more and more
risks associated with business investment in China, including the
growing gap between the rich and the poor, the communist
regime, an immaturity of the national character, and now anti-
Japanese movements. (Japanese IT Company President, interview,
February 2013)
The Japanese government has also lost confidence that overseas develop-
ment aid is an effective and useful tool in fostering better relations with
China. 
Although we have been giving ODA for many years, it appears that
it has not generated good will when we consider the anti-Japanese
sentiment taking place in the mainland today. (Japanese consular of-
ficial in Hong Kong, interview, October 2012) 
The financial risks of investment in China have been seen by Japanese
business leaders with operations in Hong Kong to be worrisome enough to
begin to look to ASEAN countries as a source of political stability, economic
opportunity, and a relationship based on longstanding post-WWII, ODA-
based exchanges with Japan that have helped develop the region econom-
ically. Several Japanese observers echoed these sentiments in the following
way:
The ASEAN states represent a 600 million-strong market that has
relatively stable political institutions, young and cheap labour
sources, and a longstanding relationship based on cultural, educa-
tional, and economic exchanges supported by ODA, JIAC, and other
Japanese institutions. Most importantly, though, it is a part of the
world that “likes” us. (Japanese diplomat in Hong Kong, interview,
September 2012)
Over time, business confidence has been greatly affected by the
great magnitude of the risk in China. There is not a bright future for
revival of investment in China. What we are seeing is that small busi-
nesses cannot afford the risk in China, and they are shifting their in-
vestment from a “China plus one” pattern to an “ASEAN-only” one.
(Japanese bank executive, interview, February 2013)
The anti-Japanese riots are another example of the risk of doing busi-
ness in China. This risk has been known for some time and our com-
pany has made adjustments. There is definitely a rise in anti-Japanese
sentiment, but in addition to this, the increasing cost of labour and
doing business has made ASEAN states such as the Philippines, In-
donesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar attractive business destinations, and
as a result we are building manufacturing centres there. (Manager,
Sales and Marketing, Japanese Manufacturing Company, interview,
May 2013) 
Local Japanese business leaders conducting business in China have to vary-
ing degrees previously stressed their uncertainty about the attractiveness
of the Chinese market because of intellectual property rights (IPR) issues;
however, the recent riots have intensified that concern:
The cost of doing business in China keeps rising. It’s too big of a mar-
ket not to be a part of, but the recent anti-Japanese riots and growing
nationalism are compelling us to look to “friendlier” markets like
those in Southeast Asia. (Hong Kong-based Japanese electronics
maker, interview, October 2012)
In addition to changes in the regional economic structure in which in-
creasing labour costs are a disincentive to further investment in manufac-
turing in China, the voices of local business leaders on the recent trade
disputes reflect concerns about the short-, mid-, and long-term impact of
growing tension between East Asia’s largest trading partners. Anti-Japanese
riots have eroded the confidence of Japanese businesses in China, and they
have begun increase their investment in ASEAN countries as a way to hedge
against the risks attached to investment in mainland China. In this sense,
China’s more assertive grassroots and government stance on the islands
may have unpredicted domestic repercussions in both countries. 
In the short term, Japanese businesses will continue to be at a distinct dis-
advantage as Chinese consumers, both voluntarily and under encouragement
from the Chinese government, abstain from purchasing Japanese brands. This
may be sustainable in the short term in China; however, there are important
caveats that need to be mentioned. Japanese exports to China do not just in-
clude Japanese brand-name goods such as electronics, cosmetics, and other
items used in everyday life. At a deeper level, Japan also exports key materials,
parts, and machines used in Chinese industries, and thus abstention from the
purchase of Japanese goods may affect Chinese industries as well. (56) From
this point of view, the symbiotic relationship between the two economies
based on a hierarchal, flying geese model may give Japan leverage in the
midterm to stay engaged in the Chinese economy. (57) As long as China remains
dependent on Japanese technology, small machinery parts, and investment,
further escalation on the Chinese side over these disputed territories could
significantly harm its economic interests. That being said, China could seek
to by-pass its dependency on Japanese technology and related materials by
establishing its own domestic supply. 
This advantage on Japan’s part is not guaranteed and could expire sooner
than later, and as a result, we may continue to see a shift from a China-
centred production network to a less centralised production network or
ASEAN-centred network. PM Abe’s January visits to ASEAN countries are
already illustrative of a more proactive diplomacy aimed at building reliable
partners in the region based on shared interests. (58) During his visit to
Jakarta, PM Abe outlined his five principle-based approach to diplomacy
with the ASEAN states: (1) expand and enshrine universal values such as
freedom, democracy, and basic human rights; (2) protect the seas, which
should be open, free, and controlled by laws and rules; (3) prosper together
by promoting economic networks for enhanced trade; (4) promote invest-
ment and exchanges of goods and people; and (5) protect and nurture Asia’s
diverse cultures and traditions. (59) Principles (3) and (4) stand out as strong
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 55
56. Yang Xing and Zhu Ni, “Zhong-Ri zhengduan buli Zhongguo jingji fusu” (How hard will the China-
Japan islands dispute hit the Chinese economy?), Jingji guancha wang (Economic observer),
www.eeo.com.cn/2012/1127/236626.shtml (accessed on 18 February 2012).
57. Kaname Akamatsu, “A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” Journal
of Developing Economies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1962, pp. 3-25.
58. Weng Kin Kwan, “Abe’s trip highlights importance of Asean,” Straits Times, 21 January 2013,
www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/japan/story/abes-trip-highlights-importance-
asean-20130121 (accessed on 19 February 2013).
59. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese
Diplomacy – The Address by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan,” 18 January 2013,
www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html (accessed on 19 February 2013).
Stephen Robert Nagy – Territorial Disputes, Trade and Diplomacy
commitments to expanding trade and investment in the region with coun-
tries that share similar values.
This commitment to ASEAN partners was further exemplified in the ce-
menting of stronger bilateral ties through trade and the supply of technol-
ogy. For example, PM Abe signed an agreement to supply coast guard vessels
to the Philippines, (60) offered ODA that included a special allotment of $500
million to fund three Vietnamese development projects in trade, investment,
and infrastructure, (61) and made a commitment to economic cooperation
with Thailand, including joining Bangkok and Myanmar in developing the
Dawei deep-sea port. (62)
PM Abe’s pivot to South-East Asia and strong adherence to employing in-
ternational norms, in particular universal values such as freedom, democ-
racy, and basic human rights, and protecting the seas, which should be open,
free, and controlled by laws and rules, are indicative of Japan’s interest in
consolidating the present international system. The emphasis on prospering
together by promoting economic networks for enhanced trade and the in-
vestment and exchange of goods and people are equally important. These
diplomatic pillars for interacting with ASEAN states are meant to reinforce
and consolidate current trade and economic relations in the region, as well
as establishing relationships that are based on shared adherence to inter-
national norms. In this sense, rather than being a revisionist or expansionist
power in the region that aims to challenge the current international system
and regional framework, Japan is bolstering its position in the region by in-
vesting in the status quo and in existing mechanisms for territorial dispute
resolution. 
With waning investor confidence in China and the overt shift of the Japan-
ese government to ASEAN, trade with China will not necessarily decrease
in volume, but there will certainly be a transformation in the nature of
Japanese investment. When asked about the future of Japanese business in
China, many informants stressed the changing nature of the economic re-
lationship from one based on China as a manufacturing centre to China as
a source of consumers. 
China represents the largest and closest consumer market for our
products. We must stay engaged despite the current difficulties. We
sell excellent products that the Chinese consumer wants or will want.
(Electronic appliance manufacturer, interview May 2013) 
The Japanese government and Japanese businesses undoubtedly recognise
that the Chinese market will continue to be a crucial one with which to en-
gage. That being said, the more assertive stance that the Chinese govern-
ment has taken with regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the punitive
measures it has taken on Japanese businesses inside and outside of China
have compelled Japanese companies, to quote one informant, “to shift their
investment from a ‘China plus one’ pattern to an ‘ASEAN-only’ one,” or some
variation of that investment strategy in which Japanese businesses are not
so susceptible to the “risks associated with business investment in China,
including the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the communist
regime, an immaturity of the national character, and now anti-Japanese
movements.”
Conclusion
Returning to Nie’s assertions that “China resolved disputes with states
that did not have expansionary territorial designs through negotiations
that emphasised mutual understanding and tolerance, and worked to-
wards a mutually beneficial and equitable solution,” (63) the shift in trade
between Japan and China in the wake of the fall 2012 territorial dis-
putes represents a turning point in their traditional seikei bunri rela-
tionship. 
Similarly, the application of O’Shea’s sovereignty game framework has
also shown us that China’s traditional approach to post-WWII territorial
dispute settlement has become more enterprising, in that China has been
able to leverage its economic relationship with Japan to negatively affect
the latter’s trading position while at the same time undermining its unques-
tioned sovereignty through repeated incursions into disputed territory. It
must also be said that the more assertive approach is not merely a result
of a shift in policy towards Japan; rather we should understand the shift in
approach on territorial issues by China as the outcome of domestic political
tensions and divisions within China.
These tools of analysis demonstrate that the territorial dispute did have
an effect on trade relations between Japan and China and that the tradi-
tional understanding between them that economics should be prioritised
over political issues has collapsed in the short term and perhaps shifted
in the mid and long term. This conclusion seems to be bolstered by the
voices of Japanese business leaders conducting business in China and
their growing concerns over the risks associated with this. The shift of
the Japanese government and Japanese businesses’ interests towards
ASEAN states, and the growing investment and commitment to cooper-
ate with ASEAN partners further buttress the argument that trade rela-
tions based on the separation of politics and economics is no longer
viable. Inclusion of Japan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would pro-
vide further evidence that Japan is decreasing its economic dependence
on China while strengthening and broadening its economic engagement
with other regions of the world by joining a trade agreement that stresses
the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) and “cross-cutting is-
sues like competition, capacity-building, e-commerce, financial services,
investment, environment, government procurement, intellectual prop-
erty, investment, labour, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and trade reme-
dies.” (64)
Several caveats need to be included in this analysis. First, China, Japan, and
South Korea are currently engaged in negotiations over a trilateral free trade
agreement. If this agreement does come to fruition, it would deepen the
economic integration between the three neighbours and make the kind of
economic sanctions and disruptions seen at the height of the territorial dis-
putes more problematic in their application. The same could be said for the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that is currently
being negotiated between ASEAN countries and their FTA partners, China,
Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. The clear assumption
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in both of these cases is that all partners abide by the agreement’s rules
and do not apply economic sanctions and disruptions to settle political dis-
putes. 
Lastly, it must be stressed that the recent retreat of official and private
Japanese business interests from engagement with China can be attributed
to a number of factors, including increasing production costs, corruption,
and an associated decline in China's profitability as a manufacturing base
relative to certain alternatives (for example in South-East Asia). In this con-
text, political disagreements and the sudden increase in anti-Japanese sen-
timent following the 2012 nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
with the attendant vandalism of Japanese property and decline in consump-
tion of Japanese products, have not been without consequences. These
events put both Japanese businesses and government on notice: new think-
ing would be required to secure access to future consumers while simulta-
neously hedging against risks associated with upsurges of nationalistic, anti-
Japanese sentiment.
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